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I. THIS COURT HAS SUFFICENT INFORMATION TO REVIEW
THE COURT'S DECISION
The record contains the factual contentions and legal arguments
of the parties and the findings and order of the court.(for example R. 78,
R. 174-170, R.378,) 1 The Court has adequate information regarding
what facts the trial court had access to in rending its decision. The fact
the court held a hearing on the matter and the transcript of that
hearing was not provided should not automatically be dispositive in
whether or not the court can review the underlying decision. If there
was no record to supply the court with what facts were presented and
arguments made, the trial court's decision would indeed be entitled to a
presumption of correctness.
On another issue in this case, the plaintiffs motion for a direct
verdict JNOV and Motion for a New Trial, the trial court ruled without
a hearing.

Under the defendant's analysis, that decision should be

reviewable, although there is even less information available for this
court to determine exactly what the trial courts basis for decision

~

actually was. In that instance, this court simply has no other option
that to relying upon the briefing submitted and the trial court's
1 The

pagination of the record is not completely sequential.

1

~

Spartanly worded order denying the plaintiffs motion for a new trial. It
is arbitrary to say that only written briefs are an inadequate record in
one instance, and adequate in another similar instance in the exact
v.o

same matter.
This issue is relatively simple. Was the extremely late disclosure
of Dr. Goldman's reports harmless to the plaintiff? This court has the
entire record of the trial and more than 2,000 pages of record materials
available to make that determination.

II. CITATION TO EVIDENCE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PURPOSES IS NOT AFFIRMATIVE RELIANCE
In the defendant's brief, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff
affirmatively relied upon Dr. Goldman's opinions. (Edwards Br. at pg
25). The plaintiff did not rely on Dr. Goldman's opinions.

Under a

summary judgment analysis the trial court's task is to, "ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material
facts are actually and in good faith controverted. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d).
In a given case, the claims and assertions of the plaintiff if not
contradicted or disputed by the defendant are deemed to be true.

2

Plaintiffs are only required to produce affirmative evidence on contested
issues. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d).
Citing to Dr. Goldman on certain issues is not a r1ng1ng
endorsement for him or his opinions, but rather merely a recognition
that certain issues have not been controverted by the defendant
through his testimony. Just because Dr. Goldman does not contradict
the plaintiffs' claims in some areas, does not mean that late disclosure
or non-disclosure of his opinions is not prejudicial to the plaintiffs
ability to prepare and present evidence at trial.

III.
SOPHISTICATION OF COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED
BY
THE
COURT
IN
DETERMINING
HARMLESSNESS
In determining whether certain omitted op1n10ns from Dr.
Goldman's report were harmless, the court considered the level of
sophistication of the plaintiffs attorneys.

(R.1693 at 415:24-416:1-2).

This court should find this notion deeply disturbing. In order to retain
any sense of legitimacy, courts must apply the rules of procedure and
evidence uniformly among all parties, regardless of who their attorney
happens to be.

The standard for determining surprise, should not be,

"Well Counsel, now that you are informed of this expert's opinion, are
3

you surprised that the actual figure he supplied was reasonable?" The
correct standard is and should be, "Counsel, was this opinion fairly
disclosed in discovery? Has that failure to disclose hurt your ability to
vi

rebut this expert's opinion in any way?"

In order to be adequately

prepared for trial, litigants need to know in advance what the opinion
~

is. Trial testimony absent prior disclosure, is anything but predictable.
Like children, witnesses have been known to "say the darndest things."

l@

IV. THIS IS AN APPORTIONMENT CASE
In his brief, the appellee/defendant argues that the instant case
does not involve apportionment at all, as Dr. Goldman's apportionment
opinion was that the plaintiff only suffered a temporary injury and
therefore 0% should be apportioned to the accident. (Edwards Br. at 30).
This is nothing more than circular reasoning.
Dr. Goldman was undertaking to allocate causative percentages
between pre-accident and post-accident pathology, his opinion is
without a doubt an attempt at apportionment. The fact that his opinion
ultimately states that Mr. Gines' permanent impairment was 100%

~

pre-existing and 0% caused by the accident, does not alter the species of

4

his op1n10n.

Dr. Goldman is attempting to apportion between pre-

accident pathology and post-accident pathology.

It is factually undisputed that on the date of Dr. Goldman's
examination of the plaintiff, Mr. Gines qualified for an 19% whole
person permanent impairment rating on the applicable guidelines.
(R.230).

To be clear, Dr. Goldman's assignment of an impairment

rating is not arbitrary, and is governed and guided by established
professional guidelines such as guides published by the American
Medical Association or the Utah Labor Commission.

The resulting

impairment rating is not, "a number picked out of the air" with "no
recipe." (R.1693 at 408:5-14).
The fact that the plaintiff has an undisputed permanent, ratable
physical impairment, standing alone, implicates apportionment. As Dr.
Goldman testified, "You always do apportionment when you do an
impairment rating." (R.1693 at 407:25-408: 1).
As apportionment is clearly implicated, the defendant carries the
burden of proof on the issue. Harris v. Shopko Stores, 2013 UT 34 if 28.

5

~

That burden of proof specifically requires the defendant to provide
the jury with "a non-arbitrary basis, a reasonable basis for apportioning
damages", and "may not be based on pure speculation." Id at 132. This
~

means the defendant has to provide the jury a sufficient evidentiary
basis to apportion the economic damages. This also means that the

44P

defendant has to provide the jury with a sufficient evidentiary basis to
apportion the non-economic damages.
While Dr.

Goldman's impairment rating number was not

arbitrary, his apportionment percentage number was. Specifically his
number of 0% and 20% respectively, were indeed, "picked out of the air."
"There is no recipe.

(R.1693 at 408:5-14).

There is no guideline to

supply those particular numbers. They were arbitrarily picked by Dr.
Goldman.
Dr. Goldman's offered the op1n10n that the injuries Mr. Gines
sustained in the subject accident were, "temporary."
4'

The word

"temporary" implies a time governed concept of measuring something
with a fixed and limited duration.

Thus by definition a temporary

injury should have fixed limits; a beginning and an end.

6

Dr. Goldman testified that Mr. Gines' aggravated symptoms began
with the accident. (R.1693 at 407:6-8)
Dr. Goldman testified he could not identify when Mr. Gines'
"temporary aggravation" ended. " ... Oh. I can't tell you when it ended."
(R.1693 at 462:3-4).Without that information, the jury is left to
speculate when it actually ended. Without the temporal end point, the
jury does not enjoy a sufficient basis to determine what economic
damages are related to the negligence of the defendant.

Without a

temporal end point, the jury does not enjoy a sufficient basis to
determine what non-economic damages and permanent impairment are
related to the negligence of the defendant.
Without any sort of temporal end point, the jury is left to
speculate regarding when Mr. Gines actually recovered and returned to
baseline.

This glaring deficiency makes Dr. Goldman's opinion

regarding the temporary nature of Mr. Gine's injuries arbitrary.
Dr. Goldman did supply the jury with information with what an
average person's recovery would look like. (R.1693 at 461:24-462:12) Dr.
Goldman even attempted to offer an opinion regarding what the

7

~

recovery of an average person with a triple neck fusion would look like.
Such evidence leads the jury into dangerous territory and forbidden
paths.
Dr. Goldman did not provide the jury with an opinion that Mr.
Gines was the average person, or even the average triple neck fusion
patient. (R. 1693 at 462:8-12). Dr. Goldman also did not provide an
opinion of whether or not this particular plaintiff fell within his own
cited averages.

(R. 1693 at 462:8-12).

The moment the trial court

prohibited Dr. Goldman from offering the opinion regarding what
~

treatment a person with altered cervical anatomy would need, summary
judgment should have been granted to the plaintiff on his claimed

~

medical expenses.
The defendant's burden of proof is not satisfied with merely
providing evidence of what happens to average people. This type of
opinion cuts to the very core of the eggshell plaintiff doctrine.

~

It is

immaterial whether an average person would have sustained injury, or
whether the average person would have recovered in a specified amount
of time. What is material is whether or not this particular plaintiff was

8

in fact injured, to what degree, and when this particular plaintiffs
impairments caused by the accident ended.
Consider if such a rule as advocated by the defendant were
applied to plaintiffs. A plaintiff rear-ended in an accident could merely
put on evidence from a doctor testifying regarding the injuries that
average people sustain in motor vehicle accidents of the type sustained
by this plaintiff in order to satisfy its burden of proof.
Under such a regime, the jury could safely concur and find that
this particular plaintiff was in fact injured, because the average person
would have been. The plaintiff would then be awarded the average
amount of economic damages for medical expenses for the average
injuries, regardless of whether they were actually incurred; the average
amount of lost wages, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is
employed and the average amount for non-economic damages e.g. pain

~

and suffering, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff actually
suffered.
Personal injury litigation typical involves proof that a particular
plaintiff sustained particular harms, whether economic or non-

9

~

economic. "A plaintiff is required to prove both the fact of damages and
the amount of damages." Stevens-Henager College v. Eagle Gate 2011
UT App 37,,I16.
ltD

Plaintiffs are not allowed to resort to speculative

averages to sustain their burdens of proof. See Canyon Country Store v.

Bracey 781 P.2d 414, 419 (Utah 1989). Defendants likewise, when they
~

carry the burden of proof, should be held to the same standard.
Fundamental principles of justice require as much.
Dr. Goldman's opinion, must provide the jury with a non-arbitrary
basis to determine when Mr. Gine's accident-related injuries and

~

impairments ended.

Resorting to averages is not sufficient.

The

defendant's burden involves putting on expert testimony that gives the
jury sufficient guidance in determining when Mr. Gine's 1nJuries,
impairments and aggravation began and when they ended. Without
that, the jury is left to pick an arbitrary number out of the air, without
regard to this particular plaintiff and without basis in fact.
The defendant also carried the burden of proof in apportioning the
causation of the plaintiffs medical expenses actually claimed and
incurred by the plaintiff.

10

The plaintiff did not know what Dr. Goldman's opinion would be
in that regard until the very day of trial. Dr. Goldman testified,
Q: Okay. And, also, in your report you did not allocate or tell us

specifically which medical bills are related to this accident and
which ones are not?
A: That's correct." (R.1693 at 407 12:15).

It was clearly the defendant's burden to provide this information
and he clearly failed to do so.
The jury's result likewise was arbitrary. It is of little comfort to
the plaintiff, that he was awarded $10,000 in medical expenses,
presumably attributable to physical therapy care. None of Mr. Gines
claimed medical expenses were for physical therapy. As outlined the
plaintiffs

initial

brief,

Mr.

Gines'

chronologically, only add up to $10,000

medical

expenses

ordered

until after Mr. Gines is

unconscious on Dr. Reichman's operating table.
The defendant provides some analysis on this point in his brief.
(Edwards Br. at pg 28).
argument is as follows.

The plaintiffs reply to the defendant's

Assuming that the defendant's conjecture is
11

accurate, the number provided by the jury, while close, is still incorrect.
The only way the jury gets a nice round number like $10,000 is if they
were adopting Dr. Goldman's analysis that a normal average person
after this sort of accident with this sort of injury would need only
$10,000 of physical therapy. There is little if any doubt, the verdict was
t.i;

materially and adversely impacted by Dr. Goldman's arbitrary
apportionment.
If the plaintiffs 1nJuries have a temporal component and
limitation as suggested by the defendant, likewise the damages should

ViP

be tethered to the same temporal component. As Dr. Goldman cannot
say when the temporal end point should be, the only result is judgment

~

for the plaintiff for the full amount of stipulated medical expenses
incurred.

CONCLUSION
The appeal has provided this Court with several different roads,
but all lead to the same destination.
The first road is to hold that the Court abused its discretion in a
defendant withholding a Rule 35 examination report during the entire
12

period of fact discovery.

The remedy should be exclusion of Dr.

Goldman, which would like to a practical result of awarding the
plaintiff result pursuant to Tingey v. Christensen 987 P.2d 588, 592
(Utah 1999), is to hold the defendant liable for the entire stipulated
amount of $61,296.60 in economic damages and to order a new trial on
the issue of future medical expenses and non-economic damages.

The

plaintiff recognizes that this road is the most severe and judicially
disfavored, in this case there are aggravating circumstances including
the central importance of t h e report to the overall resolution of the case
and the amount of time the report was not disclosed (more than a year) .
The second road is to hold that the Court abused its discretion in
permitting Dr. Goldman when his report was not disclosed during
expert discovery.

The remedy should be exclusion of Dr. Goldman,

which would like to a practical result of awarding the plaintiff result
pursuant to Tingey v. Christensen is to hold the defendant liable for the
entire stipulated amount of $61,296.60 in economic damages and to
order a new trial on the issue of future medical expenses and noneconomic damages.

This road is also severe and judicially disfavored,

13

•

but in light of the pr10r instance of non-disclosure, 1s attended by
aggravating circumstances.
The third road would be to hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in permitting Dr. Goldman to testify at trial when his opinion
on the apportionment issue, was formed, with " no recipe" and by
"pulling numbers out of the air."
The fourth road would be to hold that the trial court erred when it
denied the Plaintiffs Motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
apportionment, when Dr. Goldman admitted he could not say when the
plaintiffs temporary aggravation ended. This is the simplest, cleanest,
and least jurisprudentially disruptive road to resolution of this case. If
Dr. Goldman, an expert, could not determine when Mr. Gines' injuries
from the accident ended, it would be likewise be impossible for a panel
~

of 8 lay jurors to do so in any non-arbitrary fashion.
The only correct and expected result pursuant to Tingey v.

Christensen is to hold the defendant liable for the entire stipulated
amount of $61,296.60 in economic damages and to order a new trial on
i;i}

the issue of future medical expenses and non-economic damages.

14
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